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“Kulturkampf[s]” or “fit[s] of spite”?:1 
Taking the Academic Culture Wars Seriously 
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas* 
INTRODUCTION 
Polarization and heated debate within legal academia are 
nothing new.  Some might argue that vigorous contentiousness, even 
if not always civil, is essential to a healthy intellectual culture.  Others 
would note that lawyers, legal academics especially, are a highly 
contentious bunch with a reputation for aggressive behavior.2 
Heated debates between traditionalists and new emerging 
jurisprudential movements have been part of modern legal academia.  
Other notable jurisprudential battles include the exchanges between 
the defenders of classical legal theory and the legal realists in the 
1930s through late 1950s.  These were followed by the battles 
between the legal realists and legal process theorists in the 1940s and 
late 1950s.  The legal process school, in turn, spurred a counter-
critique by the law and society movement of the 1960s; then followed 
critical legal studies (CLS), feminist jurisprudence, Critical Race 
Theory (CRT), and last but not least, law and economics in the 1970s.  
Fifteen years ago, from his podium as Dean of Duke Law School, Paul 
Carrington suggested that “nihilist teachers,” a reference to CLS 
practitioners, had “an ethical duty to depart the law school . . . .”3  In 
the debate that followed, Dean Carrington was accused of censorship 
 
 *  Justice Myron Leavitt Professor of Law, University of Nevada–Las Vegas, 
William S. Boyd School of Law.  Thanks to Jean R. Sternlight for her insightful 
comments. 
 1 I am paraphrasing from Justice Scalia’s opening line in Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996), where he commented in dissent:  “The Court has mistaken a 
Kulturkampf [culture war] for a fit of spite.”  Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2 LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 34 (1996) (“It is 
difficult to imagine many historians of either generation writing the kind of mean-
spirited polemics law professors periodically produce.”). 
 3 See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).  
He defines nihilists as people who believe that “law is a mere deception by which the 
powerful weaken the resistance of the powerless.”  Id. (citing Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983)). 
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and intolerance.4  Dean Carrington’s defenders eventually pled for 
the academic freedom to express such views.5  Meanwhile, CLS as a 
jurisprudential movement has principally gone international, and in 
the United States only a handful of scholars continue to explore CLS. 
Fundamentally, this Article asks whether strife and disagreement 
are a necessary part of academic discourse.  Part I describes the 
academic Kulturkampfs aimed at CRT that have taken place in the 
last ten years both outside of and within the CRT movement.6  Part I 
particularly examines what it is that academics are actually fighting 
about, whether the debate is actually overly personal, and whether 
these “fits of spite” are a part of the necessary conflict of major 
intellectual movements that are required to advance the collective 
knowledge.  Describing the past and ongoing academic Kulturkampfs 
is a necessary first step to understanding whether the divide can be 
bridged and whether the conflict that we experience might lead to 
the better production of knowledge. 
Part II further analyzes what is causing the division in the 
ongoing academic Kulturkampfs.  Scholarship shrouds the 
differences in seemingly neutral terms, but much of the struggle is 
fueled by personal concerns.  With respect to outsider critiques of 
CRT, the sources of strife can be reduced to three central questions.  
First, do whites, in particular men and heterosexuals, oppress 
minorities and women?  Second, are racism, sexism, and 
homophobia so endemic that they have become permanent fixtures 
in American society?  Finally, how do you make objective judgments 
of others in a world where neutrality and objectivity are suspect?  
Kulturkampfs also play out with insider critiques.  Recently, we have 
seen struggles about who defines the discipline of CRT, and seen 
reactions to the assimilationist–separationist dilemma.  Some of the 
questions cannot be answered, or the differences bridged, but we can 
ameliorate anxieties by being more exact and careful in how we 
differ.  While resolution may not be possible, it is important to 
identify the fundamental gaps as well as areas of common ground. 
With the democratization of legal academia to include law 
 
 4 For an overview of this exchange, see generally David A. Kaplan, A Scholarly 
War of Words over Academic Freedom, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 1; and “Of Law and the 
River,” and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985) (various 
authors), which documents revealing exchanges between Dean Carrington and CLS 
and other liberal scholars (hereinafter “Of Law and the River”). 
 5 “Of Law and the River”, supra note 4 passim.  Dean Carrington currently devotes 
the bulk of his scholarship to alternative dispute resolution, not to jurisprudence. 
 6 For the sake of convenient nomenclature, I will refer to CRT, LatCrit, and 
APIA critical studies collectively as CRT. 
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professors of different genders, races, and sexual orientations has 
come a loss of community, cohesion, and coherence.  But what has 
been gained has been a more democratic and inclusive community.  
To believe that academics can again speak with a unified voice is no 
longer possible.  Instead of despairing, legal academics must come to 
accept a new order in which disagreement is a constant.  In this new 
order, the way in which legal academics choose to disagree will be just 
as important as the merit of their ideas. 
I.  THE MANY FLAVORS OF ACADEMIC KULTURKAMPF 
Legal academia’s version of the culture wars is getting so shrill 
that it has become difficult to tell whether one is experiencing an 
aggressive exchange, colored with some occasional “fit[s] of spite,” or 
whether legal academia is about to become prey to a divisive 
“Kulturkampf.”  In the last decade and a half there have been at least 
four eruptions of academic Kulturkampfs.  Each in its own way has 
left its mark on the further development of scholarship and the 
individual jurisprudential movements.  This Part examines these four 
eruptions. 
A. Vanilla Versus Chocolate:  Neo-Traditionalists Versus the Race Crits 
Professors Farber and Sherry’s publication in 1997 of Beyond All 
Reason7 touched off a high profile round between the race crits and 
the neo-traditionalists.  In their book, the authors restate for popular 
consumption the critiques they had previously published in law 
review articles.  Even though Beyond All Reason contains nothing new, 
this repackaged missive had greater impact, as measured by the 
frequency with which it has been engaged, having been reviewed by 
close to a dozen reputable scholars.8  In addition, it prompted high-
profile bashing by prominent judges, reputable news media, and 
legal commentators.9  Some reasons as to why Farber and Sherry 
 
 7 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). 
 8 For earlier just as withering critiques of CRT, see generally ARTHUR AUSTIN, 
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK:  OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 
(1998); Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157, 
1159–60 (attacking CRT on the ground that it is not “real” scholarship and does not 
deal with appropriate legal concerns); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional 
Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992) (distinguishing between forms of CRT narratives 
that are more or less helpful to understanding difficult constitutional dilemmas). 
 9 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091 
(1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Book of 
Manners:  How to Conduct a Conversation on Race—Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and 
Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051 (1998) (same) [hereinafter Delgado, Book of Manners]; 
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enjoyed a higher profile than other equally blistering critiques might 
be that these are liberal scholars, and their criticism was more 
notable because it comes from quarters where support might have 
been expected.10  As well, they are two highly regarded and well-
published constitutional law scholars teaching at top law schools. 
The attacks unleashed on CRT as a result of the publication of 
Beyond All Reason were scathing.  Judge Posner, in his book review 
essay published in The New Republic, took the occasion to call all 
critical scholars the “lunatic fringe” and critical race scholars 
“whiners” and the “lunatic core.”11  In his New York Times book review, 
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit accused “multiculturalists 
[of] rais[ing] insuperable barriers to mutual understanding.”12  The 
Wall Street Journal published an essay asserting that feminist 
jurisprudence and CRT were “antithetical to the very notion of law” 
and warning lawyers to be wary of the “mediocre legal scholars” now 
inhabiting law schools who teach that “American society is 
 
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Race and Reason:  The Assault on Critical Race Theory and the 
Truth About Inequality, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1998); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Truth or 
Consequences?  The Inadequacy of Consequentialist Arguments Against Multicultural 
Relativism, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 185 (1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 
7); Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory:  Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 
795 (1998); Deborah C. Malamud, The Jew Taboo:  Jewish Difference and the Affirmative 
Action Debate, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 915 (1998) (responding to Farber and Sherry’s thesis 
that CRT is anti-Semitic); Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues:  Approaches to 
Identity, Merit, and Responsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109 
(1997) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7); Francis G. Mootz, III, Between 
Truth and Provocation:  Reclaiming Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 605 (1998) (same); Daria Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst:  The Assault on 
Radicals in American Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1658 (1998) (same); Edward Rubin, Jews, 
Truth, and Critical Race Theory, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 525 (1998) (same); Richard A. 
Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (same). 
 10 Accord Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:  A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 668 (1993) (characterizing Farber and Sherry otherwise as 
“serious and careful commentators” and “well-intentioned” and therefore regarding 
the task of correcting their “thematic” errors as a necessary one). 
 11 See Posner, The Skin Trade, supra note 9, at 40; see also id. at 43 (“[C]ritical race 
theorists come across as whiners and wolf-criers.”); id. at 42 (“[C]ritical race theorists 
teach by example that the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a 
comfortable professional salary to write childish stories about how awful it is to be a 
member of such a group.”).  Tellingly, Professor Posner’s most in-depth analysis of 
critical race theory is his twenty-two page discussion of Patricia Williams’ narratives in 
Alchemy of Race and Rights in his almost 600-page opus, Overcoming Law.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 368–84 (1996) (discussing PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY 
OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)). 
 12 See Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law:  Are Radical Multiculturalists Poisoning Young 
Legal Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 46 (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 
7).  Kozinski also accuses critical race theorists of conspiring in the “judicial 
appointments” “game” of “picking judges who will enshrine the right policy into the 
Constitution.”  Id. 
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pathologically racist and sexist . . . .”13  In The New Republic, Jeffrey 
Rosen argued that Johnnie Cochran was an example of an “applied 
critical race theorist” when he “shameful[ly]” played the “race card” 
in the O.J. Simpson trial.14 
These critiques are characterized by their highly combustible 
quality.  Informed accounts in the popular press of the debate 
between the new crits and the neo-traditionalists were rare to 
nonexistent.  I could only locate one article in the major newspapers 
that attempted to present both sides of the debate.15  Most of the 
popular press articles carried inflammatory titles, such as Law’s Racial 
Academics Get Thrashing They Deserve,16 An Academic Theory Threatens the 
Foundations of the Law,17 and Danger:  Critical Race Theory Approaching 
from the South.18 
Not surprisingly, these high-profile barbs sparked a series of 
counter-volleys.  In a 1999 Minnesota Law Review symposium, “Essays 
in Response to Beyond All Reason,” critical race scholars Jerome Culp 
and John Calmore charged that Farber and Sherry lacked good faith 
and had mischaracterized CRT.19  But each went further.  Professor 
 
 13 Heather MacDonald, Rule of Law:  Law School Humbug, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 
1995, at A21. 
 14 Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. 
 15 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Black Scholars View Society with Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 1997, at A11 (interviewing or quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Dan Farber, and Suzanna 
Sherry as well as Tanya Lovell Banks, Anthony Cook, and Patricia Williams). 
 16 Michael Skube, Law’s Radical Academics Get Thrashing They Deserve, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Nov. 16, 1997, at 12L (commenting that CRT “retail[s] absurdities”). 
 17 William Domarski, An Academic Theory Threatens the Foundations of the Law, 143 
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 21, 1997, at 3 (praising Farber and Sherry for “taking us 
away” from the “Alice in Wonderland” world of the radical multiculturalists). 
 18 Heather Mallick, Danger:  Critical Race Theory Approaching from the South, 
TORONTO SUN, Feb. 16, 1997, at C10 (describing CRT as “overblown and foolish” and 
the “product of cheap shots and blind prejudice”); see also Shawn Mitchell, Critical 
Race Theory:  A Legal Argument to Radically Alter Rights in U.S., ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
July 25, 1993, at 9A (arguing that CRT solutions are “impractical, unconstitutional . . 
. and make race relations much, much worse”); George F. Will, Editorial, Playing the 
Race Card, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 1996, at B8 (accusing critical race theorists 
of “playing the race card”); Legal Mumbo Jumbo Law Professors’ Jokes, ARIZ. 
REPUPLIC/PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1995, at B4 (reporting that law professors “play 
jokes on students called CRT and feminist jurisprudence”). 
 19 John O. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior—Part 2:  A Critical 
Response to the Hegemonic “Truth” of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1589, 1617 (1999) (“[The] most troubling [thing] about the Farber-Sherry view is 
that I do not see good faith there. . . .  [T]here is just too much bad, ‘unavoidable 
conclusion’ stuff . . . .”); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone:  Race and White 
Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1654–55 (1999) (asking, almost rhetorically, how the 
author’s work regarding minority assimilation could have been misread, and 
connecting Farber and Sherry’s mischaracterization of his work to attacks in the 
national media characterizing CRT as having an “ugly streak”). 
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Calmore accused Farber and Sherry of “dehumaniz[ing]” CRT 
scholars by playing into negative racial stereotypes,20 of “hav[ing] 
written quite the officious and condescending book . . . [which] 
should really be buried,”21 and of “act[ing] as secret agents of a very 
right-wing racial project” describing the attacks as “not friendly fire at 
all, but, rather, enemy fire . . . a command for the critical race 
theorists to ‘shut up’ and ‘stay in your place.’”22  Finally, Professor 
Calmore posited that Farber and Sherry’s “racism represents a bias for 
people of color, but only as long as people of color stay in our place.”23  
Professor Culp charged that Farber and Sherry wrote a book that 
“appeases the conservative thirst to smite infidels” and “has only the 
barest pretensions of the objectivity or the thoroughness that they 
require of others.”24  He connected Farber and Sherry’s uncharitable 
mischaracterization of his work to attacks on CRT by the national 
media.25 
CRT theorists were not the only ones that charged that Farber 
and Sherry’s critique was excessive and unhelpful.  Feminist scholar 
Kathryn Abrams detailed at length her countercharge that Farber 
and Sherry uncharitably abbreviated feminist and critical race 
scholars’ works, painting feminists and critical race theorists to be 
extreme and nonsensical.26  Professor Edward Rubin as well was 
critical of Farber and Sherry’s overbroad arguments, seeing crits 
more as the current heirs of postmodern continental philosophy, 
than as a “threat” to traditional academic values.27  Professor Deborah 
Malamud countered Farber and Sherry’s charge that critical race 
scholarship is anti-Semitic, arguing that this argument is both 
overbroad and overly simplistic, and fails to take into account the 
unique socioeconomic situation of Eastern European Jewish 
 
 20 Calmore, supra note 19, at 1598.  Professor Calmore further explains that, “[i]n 
many ways, Farber and Sherry have taken the humanity out of critical race theory 
and linked it to the racial grotesque.”  Id. 
 21 Id. at 1591. 
 22 Id. at 1605. 
 23 Id. at 1606. 
 24 Culp, supra note 19, at 1638, 1655. 
 25 Id. at 1654–55.  For other critical race theorists’ critiques, see generally 
Delgado, Book of Manners, supra note 9, at 1059 (drawing parallels between Farber 
and Sherry’s work and white imperial scholarship and arguing that this kind of thrust 
drowns out the works of young critical scholars who might have something new and 
innovative to say); Roithmayr, supra note 9, at 1658 (suggesting that Farber and 
Sherry seem to imagine that a handful of “angry radical scholars, dark-skinned 
fanatics in their Che Berets” might take over legal academia). 
 26 Abrams, supra note 9, at 1091. 
 27 See Rubin, supra note 9, at 532. 
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emigrants at the turn of the century.28 
Farber and Sherry responded by cataloging the “insults [that] 
flow freely in the law reviews” and accusing these critical theorists of 
using charges of racism to avoid valid criticisms.29  The titles of two 
other essays in the Minnesota Law Review symposium further illustrate 
the “gloves off,” “no-prisoners” approach that characterized this 
important debate.  For example, Matthew Finkin’s contribution was 
entitled “QUATSCH!,” colloquial German for “nonsense.”30  Professor 
Subotnik used the not too subtle acronym “CRAT,” which comes 
close to “crap,” to describe CRT.31  Steven Gey was only a tad more 
polite, entitling his essay Why Rubbish Matters.32 
Amazingly, Farber and Sherry maintain that they wish to 
“encourage dialogue.”33  The problem, as they see it, is with “the most 
radical forms of deconstruction.”34  Yet, it is difficult to see how this 
strident rhetoric, only briefly captured here, can ever possibly lead to 
intellectual engagement.35  Not only is this debate more shrill than 
illuminative, it also comes through as a very personal fight for 
everyone involved.36 
The Farber and Sherry attacks are now over a decade old.37  They 
did encourage virulent and unfair attacks in the media on CRT and 
its practitioners.  Notwithstanding, CRT is still firmly lodged within 
 
 28 See Malamud, supra note 9, at 921–40; see also Hills, supra note 9, at 185 
(criticizing Farber and Sherry’s overuse of consequentialist arguments). 
 29 See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Criticism?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1735, 1738–40 nn.6–24 (1999). 
 30 Matthew W. Finkin, QUATSCH!, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1681 (1999).  Finkin believes 
that CRT is comparable to fascism.  Id. at 1700. 
 31 See Daniel Subotnik, What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory?:  Reopening the Case 
for Middle Class Values, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 682 n.4 (1998) (“I use this 
acronym to distinguish race theorists from CRITs.”). 
 32 Steven G. Gey, Why Rubbish Matters:  The Neoconservative Underpinnings of Social 
Constructionist Theory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707 (1999). 
 33 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 141. 
 34 Id. at 140.  This may be an attempt perhaps on their part to not include in 
their attacks certain genres of CRT that they do respect, particularly feminist 
scholarship, in which Professor Sherry sees herself participating. 
 35 Accord AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 199 (“A plea for a friendly dialogue is seemingly 
incongruous in the face of the heated exchanges . . . .”); Anne M. Coughlin, C’est 
Moi, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (1999) (finding it “harder than ever to imagine the 
two schools meeting”). 
 36 See, e.g., infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text; Abrams, supra note 9, at 
1112 n.38 (interjecting that she takes her Jewish identity seriously and finding 
unseemly charges that the “multiculturalists” are anti-Semitic); see also supra note 19 
(providing responses of Professors Calmore and Culp to Farber and Sherry). 
 37 In their book, Beyond all Reason, supra note 7, the authors reconfigure their 
criticism initially published in Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out 
of School:  An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STANFORD L. REV. 807 (1993). 
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legal academia, and is arguably doing well.38  There is at least one 
CRT scholar at most of the elite law schools, CRT workshops and 
conferences continue in one form or another, and the second 
generation CRT movements such as LatCrit and APIA (Asian/Pacific 
Islander American) critical scholarship are doing well within legal 
academia.  CRT’s influence has expanded beyond legal scholarship, 
as there are now anthologies in education, sociology, and religious 
ethics.39 
B. Java, Mocha, or Coffee?:  Randall Kennedy and the Dispute over a 
“Voice of Color” 
Predating this row came a very high-profile challenge to CRT by 
Professor Randall Kennedy in his Racial Critiques of Legal Academia.40  
This Kulturkampf never approached the combustible quality of the 
Beyond All Reason exchanges, and unlike the Beyond All Reason 
exchange, it has had a far greater positive impact on the development 
of critical race scholarship.  Professor Kennedy, in an article 
published just before he made tenure at Harvard Law School, 
critiqued critical race theorists Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and 
Mari Matsuda,41 arguing that critical race scholars exhibit “a tendency 
to evade or suppress complications that render their conclusions 
problematic . . . [because] [t]hey fail to support persuasively their 
claims of racial exclusion or their claims that legal academic scholars 
 
 38 For some the jury is still out; see, for example, POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra 
note 11, at 105 (“[A] dislocation of the settled ways of thinking could improve the 
field.  Law and economics has had this effect, and feminist legal scholarship as well.  
Maybe minority scholarship will too.”).  But Professor Jeffrey Stempel notes that 
“substantial . . . acceptance” is all that is necessary for outsider jurisprudence to take 
a hold in legal academia.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or 
Crumbling Construct?  Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. 
L. REV. 659, 697 n.137 (1993).  Stempel cites as evidence that feminism, CLS, and law 
and economics, in spite of initial strident objections, obtained substantial acceptance 
in academe within a few years.  Id. 
 39 See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION (1999) 
(providing a study by a historian applying theoretical work by Williams and others to 
studying how race was “reconstructed” during the post-Civil War era); RACE IS—RACE 
ISN’T:  CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUCATION (Laurence 
Parker et al. eds., 1996) (performing series of studies that apply work by Williams, 
Delgado, and Bell to race conflicts in primary education); SHARON D. WELCH, SWEET 
DREAMS IN AMERICA:  MAKING ETHICS AND SPIRITUALITY WORK (1999) (applying 
Williams’ and other CRT theoretical approaches to rethinking a religious ethic of 
progressive social change and current issues of multiculturalism). 
 40 Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 
(1989) [hereinafter Kennedy, Racial Critiques]. 
 41 Id. at 1781–84.  Kennedy’s critique is often cited with Stephen Carter’s, 
another Harvard Law School professor.  See Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black, and 
Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 6. 
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of color produce a racially distinctive brand of valuable scholarship.”42  
Professor Kennedy contended that these critical minority scholars 
placed too much emphasis on an experienced commonality of 
“oppression,” and in particular, that Professors Delgado and Bell 
overstated the relative influence of racial prejudice.43  In a passage 
that was close to getting personal, Professor Kennedy confronted 
Professor Derrick Bell’s ongoing one-man crusade against Harvard 
Law School, which had failed to hire any African American women 
faculty for almost three decades.44  Kennedy asserted that Bell failed 
to engage competing hypotheses to explain the small number of 
professors of color in elite law schools.45  In critiquing Professor Mari 
Matsuda’s work, Professor Kennedy asserted that she overstated the 
values of a “special” or “distinct” minority legal scholarship and by 
making that argument stigmatized other minority scholars by 
claiming that they speak as “victims of racial oppression.”46 
The Kennedy critique occasioned great consternation among 
critical race and liberal scholars.  Randall Kennedy’s high visibility 
position within legal academia, as one of two African American male 
professors who had succeeded Derrick Bell at Harvard Law School, 
played a critical role in the notice that his attack received.  
Interestingly, Randall Kennedy styles himself a “race relations” 
scholar,47 and has written extensively, albeit primarily from an 
individualistic perspective, about the (mis)treatment and 
(mis)characterizations of African Americans in the law.48 
 
 42 Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1749. 
 43 Id. at 1770, 1776. 
 44 DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY:  REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT 
PROTESTOR (1994).  The relationship, as depicted in published writings, between 
Professors Kennedy and Bell can be currently characterized as highly personal and 
acrimonious.  Compare Derrick Bell, The Strange Career of Randall Kennedy, NEW 
POLITICS, Summer 1998, at 55 (describing Kennedy as “quite willing to take his 
differences with black people public in ways that—whether intended or not—serve to 
comfort many whites and distress blacks” and that “render him an apologist [for] 
aspects of [a] . . . system that are less overtly racist than in earlier times but no less 
ominous in the threat they pose for all blacks”), with Randall Kennedy, Race Relations 
Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 2001–04 (2000) 
(responding to Bell’s critique and arguing that Bell is overly certain of what is the 
“correct” civil rights position on controversial race relations issues) [hereinafter 
Kennedy, Race Relations Law]. 
 45 Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1764. 
 46 Id. at 1778. 
 47 See Kennedy, Race Relations Law, supra note 44, at 1985–2010 (arguing that race 
relations law should be taught as a standard part of a law school’s curriculum). 
 48 See, e.g., RANDALL L. KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, MARRIAGE, 
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003); RANDALL L. KENNEDY, NIGGER:  THE STRANGE CAREER 
OF A TROUBLESOME WORD (2002); RANDALL L. KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 
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The response by critical race scholars was published in a 
symposium issue of the Harvard Law Review.49  Perhaps the most 
perceptive counter-critique was Dean Alex M. Johnson’s The New Voice 
of Color.50  In his analysis, Dean Johnson argued that Bell, Matsuda, 
and Delgado speak from a communalistic perspective and from 
egalitarian ideology, while on the other hand, Kennedy’s 
interpretation of racial experience is individualistic and 
meritocratic.51  Further, Kennedy does not make claims for the entire 
community of racial minorities; rather, he insists that the individual 
voice of African American conservatives and neo-conservatives be 
given as much weight as the voices of egalitarian progressives such as 
Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda.52   By contrast, Johnson characterized 
Matsuda, Bell, and Delgado as wishing to improve the circumstances 
of those in minority communities who are most disadvantaged and as 
believing that responsibility for alleviating this wrong lies in the white 
male community which historically has been advantaged by such 
social hierarchies.53 
At the time, the Kennedy versus Bell–Delgado–Matsuda 
controversy was believed to be divisive among minority legal scholars, 
and some criticized Kennedy privately for making his critique so 
pointed and public.  Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal 
Academia, a symposium response appearing in the Minnesota Law 
Review, Professor Alex Johnson’s friendly comment, and other well-
written and influential commentary by Professors Duncan Kennedy54 
and Richard Delgado55 helped to highlight that at the heart of this 
 
(1997).  For an extensive discussion of Kennedy’s views on interracial adoption, see 
Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421 
(2004). 
 49 Colloquy, Responses to Randall Kennedy’s Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1844, 1844–86 (1990) (presenting commentary by Scott Brewer, Milner 
S. Ball, Robin D. Barnes, Richard Delgado, and Leslie G. Espinoza); Leslie G. 
Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises:  Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 
1884–86 (1990) (arguing that minority works express the profound effect of racism 
and recognize the manifestations of racial exclusion). 
 50 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2008–11 
(1991). 
 51 Id. at 2036, 2040–42. 
 52 Id. at 2047. 
 53 Id. at 2040, 2045–47. 
 54 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (criticizing Randall Kennedy from a CLS perspective). 
 55 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left–Right Parallels in Recent 
Writings About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547 (1991) (identifying the gap between 
“neo-conservatives” and “crits” as resulting from different emphases on individual 
agency and volition, use of history, and whether the key to racial oppression is 
individual acts of discrimination or systemic societal forces); Richard Delgado, 
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controversy was a genuine and deep difference of opinion as to what 
a minority perspective might be, its potential value to legal 
scholarship, how prevalent and endemic racism was rooted in 
American society and elite institutions, and what methodologies 
should be used in analyzing racial issues.  These are fundamental 
differences that go to the heart of the CRT enterprise, and continue 
to divide scholars, both within CRT and without.  The issues of anti-
essentialism and the problematic use of terms like “subordination,” 
which simultaneously disempowers even as it identifies a systemic 
inequality, broached by Professor Kennedy, remain important and his 
critique helped CRT recognize, at a very initial point, that there 
would be ongoing disagreements as to the value of CRT or “Black 
scholarship.”56  Professor Kennedy remains outside of the CRT 
movement, but remains committed to continue to explore “the 
depth, complexity, and pervasiveness of racial controversies in the 
United States.”57  He has recently called for law schools to do a better 
job educating young lawyers in the complexities of race relations; to 
fail to do so, he intimates is the equivalent of educational 
malpractice.58  This is a position that CRT scholars would 
enthusiastically endorse. 
C. Lemons or Lemonade?:  APIA Crits and the Call for a New Legal 
Movement 
A very similar split occurred in an exchange that featured Jim 
Chen,  Farber and Sherry’s then-colleague at the University of 
Minnesota Law School, and eight critical race and liberal scholars.   
Professor Chen launched the first strike in Unloving,59 a short essay 
 
Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle:  Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (addressing Randall Kennedy's essentialism critique). 
 56 For example, Delgado’s collection on critical race theory includes Randall 
Kennedy’s critique as well as Leslie Espinoza’s rebuttal.  See CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  
THE CUTTING EDGE 431–57 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter DELGADO, CRT: 
THE CUTTING EDGE].  In a section entitled, “Criticism and Self-analysis,” Delgado 
acknowledges Kennedy’s contribution to CRT:  “[S]ometimes a movement’s themes 
and distinctive contours will emerge most clearly in the crucible of criticism.”  Id. at 
431.  As well, Professors Jerome Culp and Alex Johnson underscore points of 
agreement between their CRT perspective and Kennedy’s, yet both maintain that 
Kennedy’s “race relations” approach is unpersuasive.  See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., 
Toward a Black Legal Scholarship:  Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 
103; Johnson, supra note 50, at 2040. 
 57 Kennedy, Race Relations Law, supra note 44, at 1986. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145 (1994).  For the only commentary on 
this debate, see Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 
535 (2001). 
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that criticized Professor Robert Chang’s declaration of an “Asian 
American Moment” propitious for launching a new critical Asian 
American legal scholarship.60  Professor Chang was hearkening back 
to the 1980s when a group of critical scholars had declared a key 
“moment” for critical race theory.61  Chen’s objection to Chang’s rally 
call centered around what he characterized as “racial 
fundamentalism,” 62 a mode of racial thinking that he boiled down to 
the tenet, “dark skin good, white skin bad.”63  Chen argued that 
Chang’s “racial fundamentalism” opposed assimilation,64 ignoring the 
reality of what Chen viewed as inevitable “creolization”—by which 
Chen meant interbreeding—of America,65 and fostered segregation 
and isolation of racial and ethnic minorities.66  Moreover, Chen 
argued that Chang condemned the “creolization” of America.67  As 
support, Chen pointed to a Chang footnote in which he bemoans 
that his “future children and their future children will always be Asian 
Americans.”68  From this remark, Chen concluded that Chang 
“certainly seems as though he positively wants his descendants to have 
naught but Asian blood.”69 
 
 60 See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race 
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1314 (1993) (“The 
time has come to announce once again an Asian American Moment.  With it comes 
an Asian American Legal Scholarship . . . .”); see also ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED:  
ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE 48 (1999) (“A critical Asian American 
legal studies is needed to change the current racial paradigm, which is inadequate to 
support a more complete discourse on race and the law.”). 
 61 See CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
xvi–xix (Kimberlè Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Culp, supra note 56, at 40 
(announcing “an African-American Moment, when different and blacker voices will 
speak new words and remake old legal doctrines”). 
 62 Chen describes racial fundamentalism as proposing, 
(1) that white racism has always thwarted and will always thwart equality 
for nonwhites in America, (2) that nonwhites will always be at a 
disadvantage within white-dominated society, and (3) that nonwhites 
should therefore celebrate their own isolation rather than take part in 
the self-abnegation that is assimilation. 
Chen, supra note 59, at 158–59. 
 63 Id. at 156. 
 64 Id. at 158 (“Chang has plainly rejected the goal of integration through 
multiracial assimilation and adaptation.”).  But see infra note 74 (rebutting this 
reading of Chang’s work). 
 65 Chen, supra note 59, at 150, 152 (“I regard the United States of America as the 
Creole Republic. . . .  Crossbreeding in the Creole fashion . . . extends to the 
bedroom.  Sexuality, like water and money, seeks its own level.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 66 Id. at 161–62. 
 67 Id. at 155 (“What I call ‘racial fundamentalism’ rejects . . . the rise of the 
Creole Republic.”). 
 68 Id. at 158 (citing Chang, supra note 60, at 1318–19 n.403). 
 69 Id. at 159. 
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Eight scholars responded to Chen in the Iowa Law Review’s 
subsequent symposium on Unloving.70  As in the prior symposium 
counter-critiquing Professor Randall Kennedy, many articulated 
broader themes highlighting once again that at the core of this 
debate are fundamental differences in perspectives on race relations 
in America.71   Several argued that Chen’s optimistic claims of the 
inevitable American “creolization” are neither persuasive, nor backed 
by either history or the current politics of majority–minority 
relations.72  Chen’s view that Americans of all ethnicities and race 
would eventually assimilate was viewed by some as unsupported 
musings.73  Others rebutted Chen’s ungenerous reading of Chang’s 
footnote.74 
Professor Chen’s highly charged personal attack of Professor 
Chang, however, prompted responses with a personal edge.  Several 
scholars condemned Unloving as “backlash scholarship,”75 “vicious 
 
 70 Colloquy, 81 IOWA L REV. 1467 (1996) (commentary by Keith Aoki, Margaret 
Chon, Garret Epps, Frederick Dennis Greene, Neil Gotanda, Natsu Saito Jenga, Peter 
Kwan, and Alfred Yen). 
 71 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Chon on Chen and Chang, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1536 
(1996) (describing how the disagreement can be traced to modernist and 
postmodernist modes of knowing); Neil Gotanda, Chen the Chosen:  Reflections on 
Unloving, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1589–90 (1996) (arguing that Chen fails to 
recognize that the category “Asian American” is contested and complex, unlike 
Chang); Natsu Saito Jenga, Unconscious:  The “Just Say No” Response to Racism, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 1503, 1504–06 (1996) (noting that Chang and Chen differ as to whether 
color blindness is a solution to racism); Peter Kwan, Unconvincing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
1557, 1559–60 (1996) (finding that interracial mixing is an aspiration from critical 
race theory perspective and not a current social reality, which is Chen’s starting 
point); Alfred C. Yen, Unhelpful, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1573, 1578–79 (1996) (noting that 
Chang and Chen differ as to whether oppression occasions a shared group 
perspective). 
 72 See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 71, at 1588–89 (arguing that Chen wrongly uses 
older racial science, ignoring a century of evolving scientific contentions of 
biological descent). 
 73 See, e.g., Chon, supra note 71, at 1540–54 (contending that Chang fails to make 
the case for inevitable minority assimilation); Jenga, supra note 71, at 1518 (“Creating 
interracial families cannot, on its own, eliminate racism. . . .  [Rather it] almost 
guarantees that one will not be able to proceed in a ‘colorblind’ manner . . . 
[because] [i]nterracial couples face heightened scrutiny by both the general public 
and their family, friends and acquaintances.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Garret Epps, What’s Loving Got to Do with It?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1489, 
1491–92 (1996) (arguing that Chang’s footnote is a “slender reed” and Chen only 
offers anecdotes from his own personal experience to rebut Chang’s careful 
analysis); Jenga, supra note 71, at 1511 (contending that Chang did not say his 
children could not have other heritages, rather it is Chen who “forces” racial 
categories onto mixed-race offspring); Yen, supra note 71, at 1576 (rebutting Chen’s 
argument that Chang requires Asian Americans to think monolithically about race 
and scorn whites). 
 75 Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. 
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sarcasm,”76 “verbal violence,”77 “character assassination and attempt to 
silence another,”78 and “an attack ad with academic pretensions.”79  
Professor Greene’s Gunga Din80 used an imaginary dialogue between 
minority students who interviewed Professor Chen on campus to 
make the point that within some law faculties, Professor Chen was 
being interviewed as a “minority” who could not be as competent as 
the white candidates.  For example, one imaginary student described 
Chen as a “poster child for the model minority”81 who plays into 
conservative backlash politics.82  Professor Greene’s imaginary student 
continued by stating, “minority conservatism is driven by self-interest, 
self-hate, and greed.”83 
Chen responded by being “unrepentant” and accusing the 
“Unloving Eight” of being “bitter and vindictive,”  and wanting to 
“houn[d] him out of law teaching altogether.”84  Chen went on to 
write a series of essays against affirmative action prior to tenure.  But 
after being voted tenure at Minnesota,85 Professor Chen has stayed 
largely out of racial issues, concentrating his scholarly energies on 
administrative law, agricultural law, and federalism issues. 
Meanwhile, Professor Robert Chang’s call to begin the self-
conscious development of APIA critical scholarship has been heeded.  
Not only has there been a robust work product by many of the 
contributors to the response to the Unloving symposium, APIA 
scholars have had an ongoing series of workshops where serious 
scholarship is presented and young scholars are mentored in their 
projects. 
D. Cracking Coconuts:  LatCrit and the First Generation CRT 
Founders 
The most recent missive in the academic literature involves one 
of the founders of critical race theory, Professor Richard Delgado, 
 
REV. 1467, 1482 (1996). 
 76 Chon, supra note 71, at 1549. 
 77 Gotanda, supra note 71, at 1586. 
 78 Epps, supra note 74, at 1491. 
 79 Yen, supra note 71, at 1574. 
 80 Frederick Dennis Greene, The Resurrection of Gunga Din, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1521 
(1996).  A “Gunga Din” is an Indian who foolishly takes a bullet for the white English 
imperialists.  Such persons pursue “success . . . predicated on undermining the social 
and political progress of their communities.”  Id. at 1528. 
 81 Id. at 1525. 
 82 Id. at 1526. 
 83 Id. at 1529. 
 84 Jim Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1609, 1625 (1996). 
 85 Two of the votes would have belonged to Professors Farber and Sherry. 
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and the LatCrit movement, which he calls “the new generation of 
critical theorists.”86  The vehicle for Professor Delgado’s critique is his 
detailed book review87 of the anthology, Crossroads, Directions, and a 
New Critical Race Theory, edited by critical race and LatCrit theorists 
Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp, and Angela P. Harris.88  The 
crux of Professor Delgado’s critique is that LatCrit has strayed from a 
materialist analysis of race that focuses on power, history, and similar 
material determinants of minority-group oppression.89  CRT, Delgado 
laments, has become too focused on “text, discourse, and mindset”90 
and has largely neglected the important ongoing challenges to the 
civil rights of minorities.91 
Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell, also a pioneer of CRT, 
emphasize the class and political components of racial 
discrimination.  Bell’s racial realism,92 and Delgado’s thesis that 
“racism is as inherent in Americans as DNA,”93 share the premise that 
racial oppression is endemic to American society.  Both have applied 
neo-Marxist concepts of class struggle to racial conflict.94  There are 
three corollaries to this perspective that racial oppression is deeply 
 
 86 Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys:  A Critical Examination of Recent 
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 125 (2003-2004) (reviewing CROSSROADS, 
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002)) 
[hereinafter Delgado, Blind Alleys]. 
 87 Id. 
 88 CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes 
et al. eds., 2002) (hereinafter CROSSROADS).  The volume consists primarily of papers 
and speeches presented at the Critical Race Theory Conference at Yale Law School 
in 1997. 
 89 See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 125 
 90 Id.; see also id. at 123–24 (“An ‘idealist’ school holds that race and 
discrimination are largely functions of attitude and social formation. . . .  In recent 
years, idealist approaches and discourse analysis have moved to the fore.”). 
 91 Id. at 138 (citing the loss of civil rights of Muslims in the war against terrorism 
as a necessary area of inquiry that LatCrit has neglected).  Professor Delgado 
explains, “The little attention progressive writers have devoted to today's situation 
has consisted of examining the predictable issues of rhetoric, mindset, and image . . . 
.”  Id.  He queries “how critical race theorists would see the current situation facing 
this country in its struggle against terrorism and for the loyalties of democratic, 
modernizing elements in the Muslim world.”  Id. at 137. 
 92 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, SAVED]; DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF 
THE WELL (1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES]. 
 93 See Richard Delgado & Daniel A. Farber, Is American Law Inherently Racist?, 15 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 361, 373 (1998) (arguing that racism is inherent and 
intractable, like DNA); see also DELGADO, CRT: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 56, at 
xiv (contending that racism is inherent). 
 94 Bell emphasizes, in particular, how slavery was condoned and interwoven into 
our Constitution.  See BELL, SAVED, supra note 92, at 26–42 (examining constitutional 
provisions sanctioning slavery). 
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rooted in American society.  First, American society is not a unified 
whole, but rather is fragmented and divided.  Second, race relations 
in America are better described as an ongoing struggle, where one 
group wins out, not because of the inherent worthiness of their ideas, 
but because they are in a position of power.  Third, political 
structures, as well as legal institutions, maintain racial divisions.  Bell, 
Delgado, and other key writers have substantiated their view of race 
relations with a close study of American history.95  Professor Delgado 
has dedicated his academic life to understanding how systemic racial 
oppression permeates American society, and how the law has ignored 
the justice claims of racial minorities by framing such issues in 
formalist legal formulations.96 
From the beginning, CRT has drawn on the wealth of 
psychological and sociological literature on racial attitudes to 
demonstrate how unconscious racial attitudes are deeply ingrained in 
America’s psyche and social habits.97  Gunnar Myrdal’s classic, the 
American Dilemma,98 written almost half a century ago, is a 
psychological and sociological treatise on America’s deeply rooted 
race problem.  Richard Delgado recognized, obliquely, that cognitive 
theories and conflict theories—based on interdisciplinary insights—
have merit and are an important part of CRT.99  The question and the 
critique, however, is about how much emphasis on non-materialist 
theories is useful when a legal movement is dedicated to the 
promotion of racial justice.  Delgado’s essay puts it this way:  
“Nothing is wrong with working to improve racial attitudes, conscious 
or subconscious.  Yet, we should not be overly sanguine about the 
 
 95 See, e.g., id. (examining constitutional provisions sanctioning slavery); Richard 
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism:  Colorado’s Historic Embrace—And 
Denial—Of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703 (1999) 
(documenting segregation and discriminatory practices against racial and ethnic 
minorities in Colorado). 
 96 Professor Delgado’s body of work is substantial and influential.  His key 
contributions include:  RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR?:  AND OTHER 
APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE (1996); 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2d ed. 1999); DELGADO, CRT: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 56; RICHARD DELGADO, 
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES:  CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1996); MARI J. 
MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS 
CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND:  CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). 
 97 See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 98 GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN DILEMMA:  THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY (20th anniversary ed. 1962). 
 99 See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 127 (discussing Charles Lawrence’s 
cognitive theories and unconscious racism). 
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possibilities for change through this avenue alone.”100  Angela Harris 
reminded us that, in critical race theory and other identity 
movements, there is an ongoing tension between idealist–liberal 
perspectives and deterministic–materialist analyses.101 
Richard Delgado is concerned that LatCrit may be “fracturing” 
CRT.  In his view, not enough emphasis is being placed within LatCrit 
on the important new cutting edge questions.  He admonishes that 
more attention should be paid to the tension between the war on 
terrorism and the civil rights of racial minorities.102  Delgado urged 
that close attention should be paid to the impact of “the 
extraordinary growth of the Latino population” in the last decade 
and a half.103 Immigration, Delgado mused, may be “the new civil 
rights issue of the century.”104  Finally, Delgado encouraged greater 
attention be given to the role of racial minorities in our country’s 
two-party political system.105 
Delgado’s admonitions are well taken.  LatCrit scholars have 
been busy working on the very questions he raises, as Dean Kevin 
Johnson responded in his rejoinder to Delgado.106  My own work is 
currently preoccupied with what Delgado calls “the extraordinary 
growth of the Latino population.”107  The LatCrit VIII symposium 
paid major attention to the cutting edge issue of Latino and APIA 
voting issues beyond 2000.108  Victor Romero, Eric Yamamoto, Kevin 
Johnson, Bill Ong Hing, Berta Hernandez-Truyol, and Raquel Aldana 
and others have written extensively about how the war on terrorism is 
jeopardizing the civil rights of racial minorities.109 
 
 100 Id. at 143–44. 
 101 See Angela P. Harris, Foreward:  The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
741, 749–60 (1994). 
 102 Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 151. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Kevin R. Johnson, Roll over Beethoven:  “A Critical Examination of Recent Writing 
About Race”, 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004). 
 107 Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 151.  My own view on this “extraordinary 
growth” can be found in SYLVIA R. LAZOS VARGAS, CAMBIO DE COLORES (2002).  For an 
additional take on this population explosion and its effects on the American 
workplace, see Leticia M. Saucedo, The Browning of the American Workplace:  Protecting 
Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004). 
 108 See, e.g., Kathay Feng et al., Voting Matters:  APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 
Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and 
the Political Process:  The Need for Critical Inquiry, 81 OR. L. REV. 917 (2002); Sylvia R. 
Lazos Vargas, Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000:  What Does It Mean to Move Beyond 
“Black and White” Politics?, 81 OR. L. REV. 783 (2002); see also Keith Aoki et al., Race 
and the 2000 California Recall, 16 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. (forthcoming June 2005). 
 109 See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 “National Security” Cases:  Three 
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LatCrit is now a mature movement that coexists with other 
second-generation CRT jurisprudential movements.  The Crossroads 
anthology, Delgado’s critique, and Kevin Johnson’s response are 
signs that LatCrit is a healthy scholarly movement.  Professor Minow 
observed that, “[t]o be taken seriously in the business of law and legal 
scholarship means becoming the subject of sustained criticism.”110  
CRT is healthy enough to have reproduced.111  Delgado and his CRT 
first-generation contemporaries spawned a second-generation 
movement, LatCrit, which is healthy, unruly, contentious, and 
ambitious, but yet fits within the key tenets of CRT with its own styled 
emphasis.  Just as CRT grew from Professor Randall Kennedy’s 
critique, so LatCrit will benefit from Professor Delgado’s challenge. 
 
Principles Guiding Judges’ Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 1032–33 (2002) 
(describing the detention of noncitizens after September 11 largely on the basis of 
race); Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype:  The War on Terrorism and Its 
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153 (2002) (analyzing consequences of the 
“war on terror” for Latinos); Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Glocalizing Terror, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 941, 960–61 (2002) (examining the treatment of Latinos post-September 11); 
Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism:  The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 441, 444 (2002) (describing the ostracism of “Muslims, Middle Easterners, 
and South Asians in the United States in the wake of September 11” as a “de-
Americanization process”); Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants:  
Collateral Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 863–64 (2003) (examining the 
threat to civil rights and increased local involvement in immigration enforcement); 
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal:  Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the 
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 39–41 
(2002) (analyzing racial profiling and the “racially unbalanced compromises in civil 
liberties” post-September 11); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the “War on Terrorism,” 
and Immigrants:  Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 794–95 (2002) 
(arguing that increased local involvement in immigration enforcement could 
undermine community relationships and cause an increase in racial profiling); Peggy 
Nagae, Justice and Equity for Whom?  A Personal Journey and Local Perspective on 
Community Justice and Struggles for Dignity, 81 OR. L. REV. 1133 (2002) (analyzing 
impacts on racial minorities of heightened security measures); Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and 
the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1125 (2002) (noting the 
effects of the USA PATRIOT Act on Arab American and South-Asian American 
communities); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World:  Critical Race 
Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 747 (2003) 
(suggesting that the “war on terror” may create opportunities for political coalitions 
among racial minorities); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial—
Again:  African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1269 (2003) (discussing implications of the “war on terror” for the quest for 
racial justice). 
 110 See Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 115–16. 
 111 Nancy Ehrenreich has frequently made this point at various LatCrit 
conferences and retreats. 
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II. IDENTIFYING THE GREAT DIVIDES IN THE ACADEMIC KULTURKAMPFS 
The many splits in legal academia could lead one to despair, 
hide one’s head in the sand, or conclude that meaningful intellectual 
engagement, the advance of race relations, and civil academic 
disagreement are not possible.112  This Part further analyzes the 
causes of the ruptures in the academic Kulturkampfs and points to 
strategies that might be useful in dampening these culture wars. 
A. Outsider Critiques:  To What Black Hole Does the Many-Headed 
Hydra of CRT Lead? 
Farber and Sherry and the many outsider critics make the 
following claims: (1) that law scholars can ascertain a truth that is 
verifiable; (2) that law can fashion “objective” standards; and (3) that 
practitioners of law, regardless of their philosophic bent or identity, 
can clearly discern what is reasonable.113 
Professors Hills,114 Levit,115 Mootz,116 and Rubin117 have noted that 
Farber and Sherry’s modernist claim is out of sync with this century’s 
philosophical developments regarding objectivity and truth.118  The 
last century of developments in philosophical thought and social 
science, particularly postmodern philosophy, have undermined the 
notion of a unitary truth.119  Instead, this body of work, which has 
 
 112 See Lee, supra note 59, at 539 (describing CRT Kulturkampfs as having a 
particular ugly edge). 
 113 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 760. 
 114 Hills, supra note 9. 
 115 Levit, supra note 9. 
 116 Mootz, supra note 9. 
 117 See Rubin, supra note 9, at 535–37 (chiding Farber and Sherry for failing to 
acknowledge that CRT is a derivative of continental postmodern philosophy and neo-
Marxist thought). 
 118 Professors Roderick Hills and Edward Rubin focus their critique on this point.  
Professor Hills argues that Farber and Sherry’s “enlightened liberalism” is 
“astoundingly anemic” because Farber and Sherry do no more than claim that their 
truth is superior.  Hills, supra note 9, at 192–93.  Professor Rubin faults Farber and 
Sherry for failing to address the forceful CRT insight that classes who hold power in 
society are in a position to construct what truth and objectivity means, and thus 
legitimize their superior power and class status.  See Rubin, supra note 9, at 537–38 
(observing “that society’s assertions about the objectivity or truth of socially 
contingent systems, such as merit and law, reveals [sic] a basic defect in its 
underlying conception of truth”).  Professor Rubin explains that “critical race theory 
thus reveals the political and manipulative nature of our society’s prevailing concept 
of objectivity, or truth.”  Id. at 538.  This fundamental insight, Professor Rubin notes, 
is derivative of continental critical theory; thus, CRT can be viewed as part of this 
larger critique of modernist premises.  Id. at 535–36. 
 119 See, e.g., PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999); GARY MINDA, 
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1996). 
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been particularly influential in the social sciences, posits that 
objectivity cannot be independent of a claimant’s culture or world 
viewpoint.120  Scholarship based on the premise that “truth” is socially 
constructed asserts that the cognitive schemas that we carry in our 
heads and our cultural preconditioning influence what we believe to 
be the “objective” “truth.”121  Another line of scholarship explains that 
what we have come to call “reason” has the potential to exclude 
women and minorities because of the manner in which they have 
been socialized to express themselves.122 
As Professor Farber and Judge Posner, another harsh critic of 
CRT, demonstrate in their own work, “postmodern” premises have 
greatly influenced legal thinking.  In the Problems of Jurisprudence, 
Judge Posner asserts that most American lawyers are legal 
pragmatists; that is, American law as practiced is more interested in 
solving legal problems contextually than it is in asserting stable 
unitary meta-principles.123  Moreover, Judge Posner rejects unitary, 
objective truth; “[t]here is knowledge if not ultimate truth.”124  He 
champions a form of legal pragmatism that looks at problems with 
full awareness of “limitations of human . . . knowledge, the difficulty 
 
 120 The classical claim to this position is made by anthropologist Clifford Geertz in 
The Interpretation of Cultures.  See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 
30 (1973) (positing that to study a culture we should examine shared realities, myths, 
social identity, ethnicity, status, and “attempts by particular peoples to place these 
things in some sort of comprehensible, meaningful frame”).  See also RENALDO 
ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH:  THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 202 (2d ed. 1993) 
(“The temptation to dress one’s own ‘local knowledge’ of either the folk or 
professional variety in garb at once ‘universal’ and ‘culturally invisible’ to itself seems 
to be overwhelming.”).  For another view of this classical claim, see RAYMONDE 
CARROLL, CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS:  THE FRENCH-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 125–26 
(Carol Volk trans., 1988), in which the author urges us to accept that “my truth is 
precisely that, ‘my’ truth.”  She continues, “I must become able to conceive that the 
‘aberrant’ behavior that wounds me . . . may be informed . . . by the truth of the . . . 
other. . . . “).  Id. 
 121 See supra note 120.  See also Lawrence, supra note 97 (arguing that unconscious 
discrimination is so pervasive that it requires a more far-reaching contextual analysis 
of discrimination cases); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1211 (1995) (describing stereotypes as a subset of the “vast array” of 
structures that comprise human cognition and concluding that discrimination 
therefore occurs not impulsively but as the result of an accumulation of subtle 
distortions in perceiving objective data). 
 122 See Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1990, at 
126, 127 (“Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or words to 
express their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not heard. . . .  
[They] are silenced, encouraged to keep their wants inchoate, and heard to say ‘yes’ 
when they mean ‘no.’”). 
 123 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26–28 (1990). 
 124 Id. at 466. 
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of translations between cultures, the unattainability of ‘truth,’ the 
consequent importance of keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, and 
the dependence of inquiry on culture and social institutions . . . .”125 
In several law review articles, Professor Farber attacks legal 
formalism.  In one, he praises Grant Gilmore’s attack on Langdellian 
formalism, quoting Gilmore’s statement that “the body of the law, at 
any time or place, is an unstable mass in precarious equilibrium . . . 
.”126  In another article, he argues for a form of practical reasoning in 
which judges exercise their experience to fine “tune their [cognitive] 
schemata to the specifics of the case.”127  He contends that judges 
must eschew “naive” formalism and hew a middle road between 
“excessive confidence in the power of the ‘word’” and “unguided 
discretion.”128 
Likewise, Suzanna Sherry wrote a controversial law review article, 
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, in 
which she argued that “modern men and women, in general, have 
distinctly different perspectives on the world . . . .”129  The male 
perspective paralleled pluralistic liberal theory, the approach that 
currently dominates constitutional interpretation.130  She further 
argued that a feminine style of jurisprudence, which more closely 
resembled communitarian norms, might be more adaptive for 
modern society.131 
The premise of a subjective truth, then, one could argue, is not 
at the root of what these critics find troublesome in critical 
scholarship.  These critics have accepted the premise that there is no 
absolute truth, and that differing cultural and gender perspectives 
affect how different groups interpret truth.132  Instead, what these 
critics find disturbing is critical scholarship’s powerful combination 
 
 125 Id. at 465; see also id. (arguing that judges must adopt awareness of 
“translations” between cultures). 
 126 Daniel A. Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 93–94 
(1995). 
 127 Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the 
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 556 (1992). 
 128 Id. at 559. 
 129 Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543 (1986). 
 130 Id. at 543–44. 
 131 Id. at 544. 
 132 See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and 
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 106 (1995) 
(“Undeniably, pluralization, or postmodernization . . . comes at a certain . . . price, . . 
. the comfortable, self-assured determinacy afforded by homogeneity.  But this 
determinacy was always illusory . . . .”). 
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of the postmodern perspective of truth with structuralist analysis.  For 
critical theorists who are influenced by postmodernism, power 
permeates all social structures and relationships.  The truth and 
norms that will be viewed as “objective” and “neutral” are those that 
reflect the perspective of the dominant classes.  Farber and Sherry 
understand the implications of critical theory when they admonish: 
“Don’t let the isms fool you . . . the basic theory is . . . reality is socially 
constructed by the powerful in order to perpetuate their own 
hegemony.”133 
Farber and Sherry’s work is useful in discerning the principal 
concerns of traditional scholars, because they so exhaustively, 
candidly, and somewhat emotionally, articulate the ways in which 
they find critical thinking disturbing, or in their words, “beyond all 
reason.”134  Farber and Sherry reveal that they also have an emotional-
identity stake in this debate by the manner in which they derisively 
refer to critical scholars,135 engage in not too subtle name calling,136 
and charge that CRT scholars are not really intellectual.137 
Critical scholarship intertwines structuralist insights and 
discourse analysis with identity politics, making for a powerful and 
volatile combination.  It is folly to think that these issues are abstract 
and removed; rather, they are immediate and personal.  In a critique 
of Farber and Sherry by Professor Ann Coughlin, who has criticized 
CRT, she explained why CRT and its progeny touch a raw nerve: 
[T]he radical project attacks the political and ethical foundations 
of the work that traditional legal scholars do and, thereby, calls 
into question the kind of people who we believe we are.  To put it 
mildly, it is more than a bit distressing for legal scholars . . . to 
hear that their entire professional enterprise has been enlisted in 
support of a racist, sexist, and homophobic status quo, let alone 
to read that they themselves are racist-sexist-homophobic bigots.138 
 
 133 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 23. 
 134 Id., tit. 
 135 Id. at 101 (claiming that the radicals are sloppy scholars). 
 136 Id. at 142 (alleging that the critical scholars are “paranoid [in] style and 
rigi[d]”). 
 137 See, e.g., id. at 9 (asserting that the radicals “have relatively little interest in the 
nuances of philosophical theories”).  It is this aspect of Farber and Sherry’s work that 
has led Culp to accuse them of exercising white privilege “to the bone.”  Culp, supra 
note 19, at 1639.  Calmore likewise makes the case that Farber and Sherry have fallen 
prey to demeaning stereotypes of racial minorities.  See Calmore, supra note 19, at 
1598. 
 138 Coughlin, supra note 35, at 1622.  See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 9, at 1111–13 
(interjecting that the author takes her Jewish identity seriously and finding unseemly 
charges that the “multiculturalists” are anti-Semitic); see also supra note 19 (citing 
Calmore’s and Culp’s responses to Farber and Sherry). 
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The personal/emotional concerns that are at the bottom of the 
critics’ discomfort can be reduced to the following three issues.  First, 
do whites, men, and straights oppress minorities, women, gay men, 
and lesbians?  Second, is oppression so endemic that racism, sexism, 
and homophobia are permanent fixtures of American society?  Third, 
how does one make judgments of others in a world where neutrality 
and objectivity are suspect?  Let us explore each of these issues in 
turn. 
1. Agency:  Do Whites, Men, and Straights Oppress 
Minorities, Women, and Homosexuals? 
As to the issue of agency, Farber and Sherry criticize what they 
call the “social construction” thesis that “objective knowledge is a 
power relation, one category of people benefiting at the expense of 
another category of people.”139  They locate the agency for “this 
covert oppression” of women, minorities, and gay and lesbians in 
“straight white males. . . .  Everyone else is either a victim, a 
collaborator, or an unwitting dupe.”140 
In modernist thinking, someone must exercise power when 
there is a power relationship.  Moreover, there is intentionality 
between cause and effect because when one group benefits over 
another, that relationship exists only because someone willed or 
caused it.  If one can make the claim that this dominant–subordinate 
relationship is unjust, then the actor in the dominant position has 
moral culpability.  Peter Margulies, a Farber and Sherry critic, put it 
this way:  Farber and Sherry believe that the problem with replacing 
the Enlightenment commitment to “reason and cognition” with 
appeals to “rhetoric and emotion” is that “the monsters of our 
unreasoning imagination,” that is “anti-Semitism, Holocaust 
revisionism, and religious fanaticism” will take center stage.141 
Yet, structuralism generally does not attach motivation to the 
structure of inequality.142  Neither does it make moral judgments 
about those who benefit from structures of power.143  Instead, 
structuralism limits itself to describing structures of discourse and 
knowledge and how these structures construct dominant–subordinate 
 
 139 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 24. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Margulies, supra note 9, at 1126–27. 
 142 Foucault, for example, refused to locate structures of power, arguing instead 
that power infuses every social relationship.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 221 (1977). 
 143 The criticism can be made that this body of thought is amoral, since its main 
thrust is to debunk the liberal premise of individual independence and autonomy. 
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relationships and ideologies.144 
Critical race theorists could perhaps diffuse the anxiety that 
majority scholars feel when they read this scholarship by perhaps 
using more precise vocabulary when they describe structures of 
racism and oppression.  Of course, this would do nothing to diffuse 
anxiety that would be raised just because one is addressing these 
issues. 
Farber and Sherry have it right when they complain that critical 
scholars spend almost all their effort in ferreting out racism, sexism, 
and homophobia in legal practices that on the surface appear 
neutral.  When critical scholars describe the social, cultural, and 
political dynamics that account for such endemic biases they 
generally refer to these systemic constructions as “oppression” and 
“subordination.”145  In the last decade, critical scholarship and LatCrit 
theory have begun to distinguish among the various forms of 
oppression and subordination and work through the implications of 
various dynamics.  For example, there is an important distinction 
between blatant Bull Connor racism,146 unconscious stereotyping,147 
and benefiting from social assumptions because one is a member of a 
dominant group.148  The law reflects as well that these are not 
uniform acts of discrimination.149  Those who are conscious that they 
 
 144 Antonio Gramsci, a neo-Marxist, found oppression to be a function of the 
oppressed classes’ “false consciousness.”  Gramsci’s concept of hegemony involved 
“false consciousness,” consent by the great masses, and the coercive apparatus of 
state power.  See generally SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO 
GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971). 
 145 See, e.g., MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY 1–16 (1983). 
 146 Bull Connor was the Alabama police commissioner who most of us have seen 
on TV clubbing and hosing down the freedom riders of the Civil Rights era.  “Bull 
Connor” racism refers to such blatant forms of racism.  For the most part, such 
racism seems remote; it is conduct that most Americans condemn, but they also view 
it as mainly “engaged in only by other (uneducated, mostly Southern, and morally 
reprehensible) whites.”  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] 
Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. 
REV. 1493, 1524 (1998). 
 147 See Lawrence, supra note 97; Krieger, supra note 121. 
 148 The literature refers to this as “privilege.”  See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., 
PRIVILEGE REVEALED:  HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); 
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 969–71 (1993).  Jody 
Armour argues that whites can become conscious of their racial stereotypes, and 
break “habits or automatic processes” that might cause them to act in a biased 
manner toward racial minorities.  Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal 
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 755–58 (1995). 
 149 In Title VII, the doctrinal tool used to differentiate among different types of 
discrimination is the intent requirement.  See generally Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La 
Evolución!:  Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 
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are engaging in acts of prejudice or stereotyping are more legally 
accountable than individuals who benefit unconsciously from cultural 
assumptions. 
Also, the concepts of white/male/heterosexual “privilege” 
developed in the literature imply no active agency.  Rather, privilege 
describes benefits that accrue to members of a dominant class 
because of their group membership.  Social structures and cultural 
assumptions cause the dominant group to be viewed as possessing 
characteristics that mark them as superior to, and more able than, 
those who are members of the relational “other.”150  For example, 
men are leaders and active, while women seek cooperation and are 
passive.  In addition, members of the dominant group will benefit 
when society incorporates that group’s norms and viewpoint as the 
default standard for the entire society.151  For example, in the business 
environment, it has usually been the case that aggressive leadership 
style—a norm favored by men—is more valued, and therefore more 
often rewarded than a cooperative enabling style—a norm favored by 
women.  In exercising privilege, the dominant group “goes along” 
with these advantages, choosing not to see them.  Privilege then is an 
“invisible” aspect of gender, racial, and sexual orientation difference.  
In the minds of those who hold privilege there are no racist thoughts.  
Neither do they view themselves as agents of the oppression of 
minorities.  At play are both a lack of consciousness and a lack of 
willingness to question the sources of many advantages that these 
 
(2000). 
 150 Martha Minow writes: 
[A]ttribution of difference . . . locates the problem in the person who 
does not fit in rather than in relationships between people and social 
institutions.  The attribution of difference hides the power of those 
who classify and of the institutional arrangements that enshrine one 
type of person as the norm, and then treat classification of difference 
as inherent and natural while debasing those who are different. . . .  
When public or private actors label any groups as different it disguises 
the power of the namers, who simultaneously assign names and deny 
their relationships with and power over the named.  Naming another 
as different seems natural and obvious when . . . social practice, and 
communal attitudes reinforce that view. 
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 111 (1990). 
 151 Professor Iris Marion Young describes the process as follows: 
Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant 
group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm. . . . 
The culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that 
they are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered 
invisible.  As remarkable, deviant beings, the culturally imperialized are 
stamped with an essence. 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 59 (1990). 
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members enjoy because they are white, male, or heterosexual. 
A more nuanced approach to describing the various forms of 
discrimination could help to bridge the existing paradigm gap, and 
might help to make the discourse seem less accusatory.  Moreover, a 
more nuanced approach is more descriptively accurate.  If critical 
scholars are to argue for laws that change the social and cultural 
background that constructs race, gender, and sexual orientation, 
then they must also describe more cogently those situations under 
which the law should hold actors individually accountable.  A second 
implication is that critical scholars should endeavor to use terms that 
more accurately describe the forms of subordination that they are 
trying to capture.  To indiscriminately use terms like “racism,” 
“oppression,” and “prejudice,” lends itself to confusion about what 
critical scholars are actually attempting to describe and theorize.  
Finally, critical scholars should not lose sight that these labels 
continue to be loaded terms.  While it may be too much to 
indiscriminately proscribe such terminology because it allegedly is a 
“conversation stopper,” critical scholars should nonetheless recognize 
that these terms have a powerful effect.  To use the term “racism” in a 
universalistic sense has the potential to desensitize the legal 
community to this term.  A more nuanced approach could mean that 
the critical project may become less threatening to those scholars 
who perceive themselves to be in the group of “privileged” 
beneficiaries that critical scholarship indicts.  Such moderation in 
tone, and not in substance, could help to further engagement. 
2. Are Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia So Endemic as 
to Be Permanent Fixtures of American Society? 
CRT in its fatalistic form152 is deeply troubling and difficult to 
accept.  Farber and Sherry disapprovingly quote Delgado’s assertion 
that “[r]acism is natural and normal—the ordinary state of affairs . . . 
.”153  They also retell with unveiled dismay Derrick Bell’s Space Traders 
hypothetical that depicts white Americans as willing to bargain with 
aliens who will take all American blacks away in exchange for saving 
 
 152 This is my own description of Bell and Delgado’s view that racism is endemic to 
American society.  Both Bell and Delgado contest the description of their theories as 
fatalistic.  Delgado argues that his premise that racism is endemic should encourage 
us to be vigilant and not surrender.  Delgado & Farber, supra note 93, at 372.  Bell 
argues that his “racism is permanent” thesis is addressed to members of racial 
communities and functions to admonish them not to be overly confident in civil 
rights remedies and to become more self-reliant.  See BELL, SAVED, supra note 92, at 
12; see also infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
 153 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 24. 
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the rest of the world.154  Farber and Sherry cite these passages to show 
that critical theory is extreme, making three assertions in support of 
that point.  First, they assert that CRT only seeks to “expose” such 
“pathologies.”155  Second, they contend that CRT posits that “[r]eason 
is a political entity,” designed to ensconce racism, sexism, and 
homophobia.156  Third, they argue that CRT contends that justice is 
merely a “rhetorical device.”157 
This is a strong medicine for anyone, particularly for liberal 
whites who see themselves as champions of racial and social justice.  
While the proposition that racism is endemic may be discomforting 
to whites, it is a fact of life for minorities.  Bell describes that, when 
he retells the Space Traders parable, African American audiences 
instinctively grasp the racial truth behind it and nod their heads in 
assent and recognition.  The Farber and Sherry skepticism contrasts 
with this resonance that Bell achieves with black audiences.158 
Professor Bell is brutally honest about how he sees race 
operating in this country.  He encourages both racial minorities and 
whites to take an honest look at race relations and ask several hard 
questions.  First, what does it say about whites’ moral makeup that 
whites participated for so long in the gruesome system of slavery and 
accepted its indirect and direct benefits?159  Second, why do a majority 
of whites refuse to vote for policies that would relieve the suffering of 
poor people, many of whom are racial minorities?160  Third, why do 
whites appear to be unconcerned that there continues to be ongoing 
discrimination against racial minorities, even if it is unconscious?161  
Fourth, why are whites not bothered when there are so few racial 
minorities among society’s elites, as CEOs of corporations, influential 
politicians, and leading educators?162  Finally, do whites target racial 
minorities as scapegoats in order to imagine their status to be better 
 
 154 Id. at 25. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 24–25 (citing Derrick Bell, Radical Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364 
(1992), for the proposition that law and courts are “instruments for preserving the 
status quo and only periodically and unpredictably serve as a refuge of oppressed 
people”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158 See Derrick Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 
903 (recounting that most white audiences react to this story with denial and 
disbelief, while black audiences find the story plausible). 
 159 See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 6–8. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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off than it really is, and in order to identify with privileged elites?163  
The answer for Bell is that whites are only too willing to look away 
from racial problems and racial minorities’ plight.  Whites will 
advocate changes to social and political systems that relieve blacks’ 
racial oppression only when it benefits them.164  Bell concludes: 
Black people will never gain full equality in this country.  Even 
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more 
than temporary “peaks of progress,” short-lived victories that slide 
into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain 
white dominance.  This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history 
verifies.  We must acknowledge it, not as an act of submission, but 
as an act of ultimate defiance.165 
What is at play here is a fundamental schism in the 
interpretation of American history, the American legal and political 
system, and the nature of race relations.  It is what Thomas Kuhn 
describes in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as an irresolvable 
paradigm gap.166  The proponents of the racial realist paradigm 
cannot convert the defenders of the traditional paradigm, and vice 
versa.  One could view this as a form of the irresolvable “half 
empty/half full” debate.  Bell and Delgado both take a backward 
perspective that emphasizes what Bell calls America’s holocaust—
slavery.  Most traditional liberal theorists, like most white Americans, 
take a forward-looking perspective that emphasizes the 1960s civil 
rights transformation of American race relations.  Yet another 
perspective on this schism is to note that Bell and Delgado are 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 This is Bell’s “interest convergence” theory.  See generally Bell, supra note 157; 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
 165 BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12. 
 166 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–11 (3d ed. 
1996).  I acknowledge Professor Stempel’s critique that the concept of paradigms 
and paradigm gaps is overused in scholarly literature.  See  Stempel, supra note 38, at 
696 (criticizing overuse of the concept of paradigms among legal scholars but 
applying it to the field of dispute resolution).  Further, Professor Stempel makes a 
very cogent argument that Kuhn’s concept of how knowledge evolves does not fit 
well with respect to legal thought.  See id. at 695–705.  Legal theory does not undergo 
dramatic jumps forward, as have the sciences.  Id. at 696.  Law is moored to 
traditional concepts, in large part because of common-law methodology.  Finally, law 
is not “scientific,” but mirrors social thinking and reflects the ongoing changes in 
social science, philosophy and moral thought.  Id. at 738.  In sum, there are no 
sudden transformations, just slow plodding.  Nonetheless, I will use these concepts 
because they are useful to explain why well-meaning white liberal scholars, like 
Farber and Sherry, are unable to accept much of what CRT scholars are trying to say, 
and because Kuhn’s concept of engagement is at the core of how I believe legal 
knowledge evolves. 
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addressing minority communities.  Both believe that unflinching 
honesty with respect to American liberal democratic politics is 
essential for minority members to avoid being lulled into false 
comfort.  Racial realism frees minorities from false hope and enables 
them to renew their pursuit of racial justice with “ultimate 
defiance.”167  When critics listen in, however, they hear a dialogue that 
appears to condemn all white Americans.168 
Kuhn’s key insight is that disciplinary knowledge is as much a 
social construct as it is a scientific undertaking.169  Disciplinary norms 
and practices can constrain what practitioners can observe and even 
understand.170  When groups function from fundamentally distinct 
knowledge assumptions, both opponents and proponents talk past 
each other.  Each group uses its own sets of assumptions and 
principles to argue that their “paradigm” is superior.171  What results 
is circularity because neither group can convince the other that its 
arguments have merit.172  Moreover, because these groups function 
from a distinct set of assumptions, often the very terms that they use 
will not have the same meanings.173 
Racial realism is fundamentally unsettling.  Most white scholars, 
as is the case with many critical race scholars, find it difficult to 
reconcile their legal work with a perspective that asserts that law is 
incapable of solving racial and gender injustice.  Racial realism’s 
main attribute—its unflinching willingness to look at the ugliness of 
America’s racial past and present—also accounts for why racial 
realism has managed to swallow up much of the current debate.  Its 
fatalism seems to question everything that is familiar, including 
whether Americans are capable of transforming themselves into less 
prejudiced individuals.  While this is a powerful insight, it is 
unsettling to many scholars, who write because they believe they can 
persuade legal actors to reconsider how they interpret legal 
principles. 
Further, CRT is threatening to whites’ sense of a fair and 
 
 167 See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12. 
 168 See George A. Martinez, Philosophical Considerations and the Use of Narrative in 
Law, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 689–92 (1999) (describing how whites and minorities do 
not share the same conceptual framework and arguing that CRT narratives are 
largely addressed to minority communities which share a common life experience). 
 169 See KUHN, supra note 166, at 160–91 
 170 Id. at 151. 
 171 Id. (“Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm’s defense . . . 
.”). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 202. 
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innocent self.174  With uncanny prescience, Bell foretold that the 
questions raised by racial realism are “easier to reject than refute . . . 
.”175  As Kuhn and Bell would have predicted, the (white) critics have 
strenuously rejected the (nonwhite) view of race relations.  No CRT 
critic176 has attempted to respond to the hard questions raised by Bell and 
Delgado.  Yet, many of these same critics claim to be just as committed 
as critical theorists to the goal of racial equality. 
In the case of such an irreconcilable gap, Thomas Kuhn 
recommends engagement.177  Kuhn advocates that insiders and 
outsiders not stop talking to each other, and that they attempt to find 
common ground on which to continue a dialogue.178  It is 
engagement by both sides of the divide, so to speak, that eventually 
leads to “scientific revolutions.” 
There is a sliver of common ground between the CRT theorists 
and the critics.  It is hopeful that in a debate between Richard 
Delgado and Dan Farber, Professor Farber asserts that he has a great 
deal in common with Delgado because he believes that “racial 
inequality” is “central and requir[es] the most serious possible 
attention.”179  Similarly, Mark Tushnet, in his exchange with critical 
race theorists, also reiterated his commitment to racial equality, and 
acknowledged that the CRT scholarship he is critiquing “substantially 
enhance[s] my understanding of the law.”180 
Critical scholars should take these academics at their word.  
They should refuse to be distracted by rhetorical debates as to 
whether racial realism is “paranoid.”181  There can be common 
 
 174 Lazos Vargas, supra note 146, at 1524–26 (describing white racial innocence as 
an essential attribute of white American identity); see also Thomas Ross, Innocence and 
Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990) (explaining that the affirmative action 
debate is framed in the rhetoric of “white innocence” and that this avoids dealing 
with problems of unconscious racism).  Ross observes that “by repressing our 
unconscious racism we make coherent our self-conception of innocence and make 
sensible the question of the actual victimization of blacks.”  Id. at 312. 
 175 See BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12. 
 176 See authors cited supra, note 9. 
 177 BELL, FACES, supra note 92, at 12. 
 178 KUHN, supra note 166, at 161–90. 
 179 Delgado & Farber, supra note 93, at 374.  In reality, Professor Delgado and I 
share a great deal in our views of law and American society.  Both of us see the issue 
of racial inequality as being central and requiring the most serious possible attention.  
Both of us reject the conservative dogma of color blindness, and both of us believe 
that there is an imperative need for dialogue and discussion of this topic. 
 180 See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 259 n.32.  Professor Tushnet’s critique can be 
understood as urging that CRT narrative scholarship be more precise so that it can 
be better understood (or heard) by mainstream constitutional scholars.  Id. at 259. 
 181 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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ground.  The debate has to be refocused by asking how the law can 
fulfill its commitment to racial and gender equality. 
3. How Do Whites, Men, and Heterosexuals Evaluate 
Minorities Without Risking Being Called “Racist,” 
“Sexist,” or “Homophobic”? 
Critical scholars’ attack on merit and objectivity can be 
interpreted at a deeply personal level.  Farber and Sherry reveal this 
when they pose the following rhetorical question:  “If objectivity is a 
myth, and knowledge and merit are socially constructed, where does 
that leave those who cling to traditional . . . aspirations?  The answer: 
at some risk of being labeled racists and bigots.”182  They further allege that 
critical scholars believe that “all current merit standards are infected 
by racial or gender bias.” 183  Farber and Sherry capture critical 
scholars’ attack on merit when they observe that critical scholars 
reduce merit to mere “mindset,” the “bundles of presuppositions, 
received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background 
of which legal and political discourse takes place.”184  Randall 
Kennedy’s critique of Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda is also based on his 
own belief that structures of merit in institutions function well 
enough, and that a black scholar could be judged fairly.185 
Merit, as an institutional practice, impacts on both critics and 
critical scholars directly.  Critics, like Farber, Sherry, Tushnet, and 
Posner, have attained positions of influence in legal academia.  They 
make decisions as to who will enter the ranks of legal academia, vote 
on the tenure of colleagues, and serve on the editorial boards of 
university presses and peer-reviewed journals.186  On the other hand, 
critical scholars, many of whom are junior, are vulnerable to criteria 
 
 182 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 183 Farber & Sherry, supra note 29, at 1748. 
 184 FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185 Cf. Kennedy, Racial Critiques, supra note 40, at 1762–64  (urging CRT scholars 
to undertake more academic rigor in their critiques).  See also Duncan Kennedy, 
supra note 54, at 712–17 (pointing out that part of the gap between Randy Kennedy 
and CRT scholars revolves around whether there can be a neutral assessment of 
merit in legal academia, which is dominated by white elites). 
 186 See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference:  
White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1095 (1992).  Professor Culp 
believes that “a disproportionate number of blacks will not make tenure” if tenure 
standards are the same as for white professors.  Id.  Making a similar point but 
coming from a completely different viewpoint, Judge Posner also believes that “a 
disproportionate number of blacks will be turned down” for tenure.  However, 
because this will be “awkward” for mostly white academic institutions, Posner asks 
rhetorically, “are there to be two tracks . . . [with a second tier] affirmative action 
track . . . limited to blacks?”  POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 11, at 105. 
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that cause their work to be viewed as unmeritorious because these 
traditional scholars have already come to the conclusion that critical 
scholarship is “paranoid,”187 “lunatic,”188 or dangerously anti-
foundational,189 charges that have been legitimized because high-
profile scholars and the media have reified them.190 
In this case, bridging the paradigm gap has immediate and 
important implications. Critical scholarship is a jurisprudence that 
challenges not only traditional perspectives, but also confronts the 
personal, intellectual, and emotional comfort of traditional scholars.  
These traditional scholars are the same colleagues who sit in 
judgment at tenure time. 
Tenure is supposed to be awarded on the basis of merit, but is it?  
Critical race scholars have attacked the premise that merit is a neutral 
concept.  Such a critique does not lead to the conclusion that critical 
scholars reject merit altogether.  Rather, critical race scholars 
advocate reconceptualizing merit in ways that take into account the 
potential for cultural biases, whether such biases be based on race, 
gender, or sexual orientation.  Lani Guinier advises that standards of 
merit must be carefully scrutinized in order to ensure that subjectivity 
is minimized, and that “objective” standards do not implicitly favor 
one group over another.191  The critique of merit is not unfamiliar.  
Farber and Sherry themselves acknowledge that “merit” as an 
institutional practice has been imperfect, tending towards elitism and 
self-replication.192 
The continued inclusion of critical scholars within legal 
academia is important.  The Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger193 
explained that diversity of viewpoints and perspectives in elite 
institutions whose very purpose is the construction of knowledge is an 
 
 187 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 188 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 189 See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7. 
 190 See supra notes 13–18 (citing to popular press commentary attacking CRT, 
echoing what journalists understood critics to be saying). 
 191 See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming 
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 968–97 (1996). 
 192 Farber and Sherry capture critical scholars’ attack on merit.  “Judgments about 
. . . academic merit  . . . reflect the ‘mindset’ of the dominant social groups . . . their 
‘bundles of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings.’”  FARBER 
& SHERRY, supra note 7, at 52.  They go on to argue that because Jewish and Asian 
American scholars have been able to succeed in academic institutions, their success 
“proves” that the standards that have benefited them are not fundamentally flawed.  
See id. at 57–59. 
 193 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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essential project to a stable democracy.194  Legal jurisprudence has 
evolved because the legal academy has been sufficiently pluralistic to 
include those who defend comfortable notions and those who 
challenge them.  Legal knowledge is not unitary.  No single 
jurisprudential outlook dominates.  Instead, there is a multiplicity of 
approaches, with no single jurisprudential view ever being able to 
confidently claim preeminence.195  It is important that legal 
knowledge remain a pluralistic enterprise.  This dictates that a 
healthy academic environment be one where various jurisprudential 
outlooks can be aired, are engaged, and where each is in competition 
with the other.  Yet legal academia is also a social institution, so there 
are social forces at play that push legal academics towards uniformity, 
conformance, self-duplication, and “dumbing down” through the 
bureaucratization of legal institutions any ideas and practices that 
may threaten the status quo. 
For legal scholarship to remain a dynamic and pluralistic 
enterprise, the tendency towards uniformity and conformance must 
be consciously resisted.  Each individual legal scholar who is tenured 
will be making decisions as to who can gain entry into the legal 
academy through the process of voting on tenure.  If traditional 
scholars as individuals allow their discomfort with the ideas of critical 
race scholarship to temper their judgment as to the professional 
merit of critical race scholars who are up for tenure, then the 
consequence will be that fewer critical scholars will be part of legal 
academia.  No one would win in the long run with such results.  
Academics must strive to judge those who make them uncomfortable 
in as “neutral” a manner as possible, by which I mean first, that those 
who judge must become aware of their emotions and not allow them 
to color the outcome, and second, that the judgment of merit not 
become a quarrel about world perspectives on race or gender.  
Professor Edward Rubin has argued that critical scholarship can be 
judged fairly by majority scholars.  In particular, he has argued that 
 
 194 Id. at 330 (agreeing with the district court that the “[diversity] policy promotes 
cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables 
[students] to better understand persons of different races” and that “classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting 
when the students have the greatest possible variety of backgrounds”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).  See generally Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclusive?  What Grutter v. 
Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 
May 2005). 
 195 Although this is not the thrust of Professor Minda’s recompilation of legal 
movements, his book makes this point nicely.  See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL 
MOVEMENTS:  LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995). 
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CRT and other outsider scholarship should be evaluated 
phenomenologically, according to criteria of coherence, 
persuasiveness, significance, and applicability.196  Professor Rubin 
argues that the doubt and anxiety that CRT scholarship triggers in 
majority scholars by CRT’s challenge to core beliefs can be put to 
good use.197  Doubt and anxiety can be redirected such that one 
becomes more self-critical about one’s own philosophical and 
epistemological position.  It is through the process of being 
challenged and formulating responses to those challenges198 that legal 
scholarship can advance.  Scholarship, both majority and CRT, 
becomes more precise, more reflective, and more balanced through 
this process of critique and counter-critique. 
Rubin’s approach hearkens back to Kuhn’s observation that the 
key to the evolution of disciplinary knowledge is intellectual 
engagement rather than agreement.199  Although insiders may come 
to understand what outsiders are arguing, they will likely remain 
unpersuaded that the outsider paradigm is superior to theirs.200  
Through continuous engagement and explication the outsider 
paradigm gains greater acceptance as an increasing number of 
participants becomes familiar with the ideas and comes to accept its 
premises.201  As Kuhn explains, there are important pitfalls in the 
process of engaging a competing knowledge community.  Outsiders 
must recognize that there is a fundamental communications gap 
between insiders and outsiders.  They must become “translators” of 
their views.202  For example, confusion and dissention may be caused 
when the same vocabulary is used in different ways.203  Such 
fundamental misunderstanding can be avoided by more careful 
explication of terminology and fundamental assumptions.  
Challengers can communicate their views and assumptions through 
“share[d] everyday vocabularies.”204  By using common concepts and 
principles, supporters of the outside paradigm can “translate” their 
 
 196 See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 
80 CAL. L. REV. 889 passim (1992). 
 197 Id. at 946. 
 198 Rubin advises that “the very process of formulating counter-arguments, which 
is a mechanism for outright rejection of the author’s work when uncritically 
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 199 KUHN, supra note 166, at 203. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 153, 201–04. 
 202 Id. at 202. 
 203 Id. 
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own theories to the established group, and better depict the 
fundamental ways in which their view differs and the consequences of 
that difference.  Finally, supporters can “develop . . .  hardheaded 
arguments”205  and show with “concrete results”206 that their 
“paradigm” better explains certain kinds of difficult problems that 
the established paradigm has been unable to address.207 
In sum, academic Kulturkampfs are distressing at one level, 
because they signal that outsiders and insiders are talking past each 
other and unwilling to consider what the other has to offer.  
However, both Rubin and Kuhn have been helpful in their 
observations that an academic ethic of engagement can help bridge 
the gap.  The goal is not agreement, but that each side develop non-
emotional and hard-headed approaches to explaining their own 
positions and be willing to be open to the others’ basic premises and 
challenges. 
B. Insider Critiques:  Coping with a Many-Headed Hydra 
As Professor Francisco Valdés underscores, LatCrit’s principal 
analytical methodology evidences a multidimensional analysis.208  
Because he believes the dynamics of subordination—race, gender, 
class, culture, history, social group formation—are too complex to be 
captured in one or two dimensions or  “intersectionalities,”209 Valdés 
urges “multidimensional critique . . . [as] another step toward 
helping the LatCrit community better visualize and understand the 
nature of . . . critical legal theory and praxis.”210  Professor Lisa 
Iglesias has noted that this methodology enables LatCrit to “tak[e] a 
stance against all forms of subordination.”211  In addition, LatCrit has 
strived to be inclusive of multiple perspectives and groups in order to 
break through artificial structures and classifications that might 
impede the exploration of how to attain antisubordination goals. 
Such flexibility and inclusiveness can also be a source of tension, 
 
 205 Id. at 153. 
 206 Id. at 203. 
 207 Id. 
 208 See Francisco Valdes, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance, and Hope In 
LatCrit Theory and Praxis, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 899 (2000). 
 209 Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
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 210 Valdes, supra note 208, at 899. 
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which can be grouped around two clusters.  The first cluster asks, 
who defines the discipline of CRT?  The second cluster inquires 
whether or not CRT foments non-assimilation. 
1. The Power of Framing and Naming:  Who Defines a 
Movement? 
Professor Delgado’s critique of LatCrit is based on his 
observation that LatCrit has strayed from its CRT materialist roots.  In 
his view, LatCrit has “lost its focus” after a promising beginning.212  
Getting back to basics, or becoming more rigorous analysts, is what 
Professor Delgado believes is needed. 
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has written extensively about legal 
academia as a social institution.  He notes that the production of 
knowledge by academics is a forum of contestation and power.213  
Bourdieu observes that academics, as producers of cultural 
knowledge, have an interest in what kind of knowledge is produced.214  
That interest may be a larger group interest, such as the CRT interest 
in racial justice, or it could be personal, such as a researcher’s 
personal desire for status within her profession.215  People who are 
able to define a discipline and a movement can also situate their own 
accomplishments within the discipline, 216 or they can delegitimize an 
entire legal movement.  Over a decade ago, Professor Jerome Culp 
accused Judge Posner of seeking to delegitimize critical race theory 
by framing and naming: 
[M]y criticism is that Judge Posner wants to control the 
assumptions of the debate. . . .  He demands the right to control 
those assumptions without dealing with alternative assumptions 
proposed by black scholars.  This demand to control the 
assumptions underlying the discourse is at the heart of the 
dispute . . . .  White scholars often ask black scholars to jump 
through some appropriate hoop before they will be listened to by 
“real” scholars.  If black scholars are doing some mode of analysis 
in legal scholarship improperly, then Judge Posner should 
demonstrate how.217 
All critiques involve framing and naming.  What Bourdieu calls 
for is not that ongoing critiques cease, but rather that the scholar 
 
 212 See Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 123–24. 
 213 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 1–25 (Peter Collier trans., Stanford 
Univ. Press 1988). 
 214 See id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See id. at 24–25. 
 217 Culp, supra note 186, at 1098–99 (footnote omitted). 
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understand the social motivations and interests that are involved in 
her intellectual practice.218 
There will always be difficulties when insiders try to define valid 
methodologies and the core subject matter of a movement, as 
Professor Richard Delgado tried to do in Blind Alleys, or what is merit-
worthy scholarship, as Professor Randall Kennedy did in his Critique of 
Minority Academia.  LatCrit’s key strength is that the definition of the 
movement has been a collective affair.  The very structure of the 
LatCrit symposia is open, allowing those who have already attained a 
standing within the LatCrit academy, like Richard Delgado, to 
contribute in symposia and anthologies alongside those who are just 
entering the profession.  The practice of composing forewards, 
afterwords, and cluster introductions in LatCrit symposia among 
rotating CRT scholars from various disciplines is designed to import 
different individual and disciplinary perspectives.  This is a self-
conscious effort to rethink and re-situate LatCrit within its own 
growth dynamic and in the larger context of legal knowledge. 
For this reason, the definition of LatCrit is a moving target.  This 
is a good thing, but for some it is an unfamiliar practice that is too 
uncertain.  The principal tenets continue to be hammered out in 
LatCrit symposia.  The expectation is that the movement will grow 
and redefine itself as new members contribute to legal knowledge, 
and as the social and political context changes.  For example, 
responding to the increased governmental powers and policies after 
9/11, which disproportionately impact citizens of color and 
noncitizens, is now a major part of the LatCrit enterprise.  As LatCrit 
grows and responds to new pressures it may appear to lose its focus, 
but these may just be the growing pains and the cost of commitment 
to a “no star” system that ensures the inclusion of all contributors. 
2. Does Critical Race Theory Encourage Non-Assimilation 
and Separatism? 
The assimilation–separatist debate is at the heart of the role of 
minorities/outsiders in America, where the assimilationist ethic is 
very strong.  The debate between Professors Robert Chang and Jim 
Chen is partly about very different views about minorities in the civic 
polity.  Professor Chen, as “an American of Taiwanese decent,”219 
reacted to Chang’s proposal for an APIA legal movement as evidence 
 
 218 See BOURDIEU, supra note 213, at 6–7 (observing that “[t]here is no object that 
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 219 See Chen, supra note 59, at 146. 
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of “racial fundamentalism.”220  By using this term, Professor Chen 
intended to recall other religious fundamentalist movements, which 
are illiberal, absolutist, and separatist.221  Chen carried the “racial 
fundamentalism” argument into the personal realm, accusing Chang 
of advocating in a footnote222 a perspective of racial authenticity that 
is deeply coercive—that members of minority groups should marry 
and adopt only their own.223 
The Chen–Chang debate has played out before in the Randall 
Kennedy–Bell–Delgado–Matsuda rift.  These public schisms show that 
minority “communities” are diverse and can be contentious.  While 
individuals may feel pressure to conform to what they believe might 
be a “politically correct” view, they actually do not.  And there is not 
sufficient solidarity about what is a racial perspective that would 
prevent any single minority from expressing his or her own individual 
view about the significance of racial experience in America.  This is 
part of the reason that identity issues and racial narratives seem to 
crowd out the scholarly discourse, as Professor Delgado has 
complained.224  Everyone can weigh in with some legitimacy. 
Foremost, the Chen–Chang debate raises the familiar melting-
pot/assimilationist dilemma and the issue of how individual racial 
identity weighs into how one views that tension.  The dominant 
cultural paradigm in the United States has been the notion of a 
“melting pot” by which immigrants become assimilated into 
American culture.225  However, melting-pot assimilation requires that 
the majority be willing to accept the new entrant groups as equals.  
Chang’s call for a more sustained analysis of the experience of Asian 
Americans is based on his view that discrimination and oppression 
experienced by Asian Americans has been hostile and aggressive.226  
Such racism is manifested in different ways, such as the perceived 
“foreignness” of Asian Americans and the recurring belief that they 
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 221 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 223 See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Chen, supra note 59, at 155–
67. 
 224 Cf. Delgado, Blind Alleys, supra note 86, at 131 (critiquing compilation of essays 
in CROSSROADS, supra note 88, dealing with racial identity as not attaining a “unique 
voice of color” but rather as overindulging the personal emotional tribulations 
connected with being a minority in legal academia). 
 225 See Lazos Vargas, supra note 146, at 1531–34 (discussing the cultural mandate 
of the “‘melting pot’ myth”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?:  
Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997). 
 226 See Chang, supra note 60, at 1286–1303. 
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are not sufficiently loyal to the American nation.227  Under Professor 
Jim Chen’s alternative view, racial attitudes are changing.  
Racial/ethnic minority individuals, particularly those who have 
achieved upper and middle class status, can find increasingly less 
resistance to integration, assimilation, and acculturation.  This 
provides opportunities for individual minorities to assimilate in 
melting pot fashion. 
These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  As 
the earlier Kennedy debate showed, individual minorities interpret 
their own minority racial experience very differently.228  Chen and 
Chang disagree on facts and theory, but mostly they differ on how 
they conceive their own racial identity in a society where 
discrimination against racial minorities is real and ongoing. 
LatCrit and APIA scholarship has defined race as a complex 
historical, cultural, phenomenological, and psychological social 
dynamic.  Racial/ethnic communities incorporate diverse cultural 
traditions, and may encourage assimilation.  Regional histories are 
another important differentiator.  In the case of Asian Americans, 
their racial oppression was most acute in California, the Northwest, 
and Hawaii, where Japanese Americans experienced forced 
internment during World War II.  These are areas where we would 
expect the boundaries of race to be at their most inflexible and 
unforgiving. 
With such variability, it follows that an individual’s interpretation 
of his or her racial experience will also be highly varied.  Jim Chen 
does not feel or view himself as an outsider minority scholar, and he 
prominently protested the possibility that a fellow scholar of Asian 
decent might view him as such.229  To make this “choice” so publicly 
and trenchantly seems an odd sort of theater.  Nonetheless, Professor 
Chen’s racial identity “choice” is as legitimate as Bob Chang’s racial 
identity “choice.” 
However, all things are not equal.  These competing narratives 
of racial experience were received differently.  Jim Chen’s perspective 
validated many of the beliefs held by white academics, among them 
those who are hostile to CRT.  Chen’s narrative was embraced as 
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validation of a hostile view of the precepts of CRT.  On the other 
hand, Chang, from the very beginning, meant to challenge 
established legal academia.  His public announcement of his racial 
perspective and his aim to challenge legal academia by calling for a 
moment of APIA critical scholarship made white academics 
uncomfortable.  Chang’s path was by far the riskier. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal academia has gone through various Kulturkampfs, with 
CRT having gone through more than its share.  The question is not 
whether there will be more in the future because undoubtedly there 
will be.  The gaps are based in knowledge and perspective, but what 
seems to impede the dialogue most is how identity and ego get in the 
way of a healthy dialogue. 
Critical theorists can help bridge the gap.  First, they must 
reclaim the prerogative to define the critical project.  In a movement 
like LatCrit the challenge of framing the movement is inherently 
difficult because LatCrit is self-consciously inclusive, elastic, and 
dynamic.  Critical scholars, however, should constantly articulate what 
they stand for and should resist the temptation, put forth by critics, to 
simplify the contours and content of critical scholarship.  Some may 
argue that complexity and contradiction might weaken the voice of 
critical scholarship.  However, the insider Kulturkampfs show that 
anti-essentialism and complexity more accurately capture what CRT is 
and may be able to minimize controversy and confusion. 
The critical question is not whether there will be ongoing 
Kulturkampfs, but whether there can be an ongoing ethic of 
engagement.  Both sides must continuously explain how it is that they 
differ and the basis for their differences.  Both sides must seek to 
establish a common language so that there can be some progression 
of understanding of our human condition and how the law affects it. 
In sum, what is required is that both critical theorists and the 
critics exhibit patience with each other and attempt to acknowledge 
their knowledge gaps.  In addition, both sides need to probe beyond 
the distracting rhetoric and earnestly identify where there is common 
ground.  There is one practice that unifies legal academics.  Justice is 
a value that is neither outmoded nor suspect. 
 
